Muhammad Idrees Ahmad, The Electronic Intifada, 8 June 2009
In Errol Morris's 2004 film The Fog of War, former US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara recalls General Curtis LeMay, the architect of the fire-bombings of Japan during World War II, saying that "if we'd lost the war, we'd all have been prosecuted as war criminals." LeMay was merely articulating an unacknowledged truism of international relations: power bestows, among other things, the right to label. So it is that mass slaughter perpetrated by the big powers, from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan, is normalized through labels such as "counterinsurgency," "pacification" and "war on terror," while similar acts carried out by states out of favor result in the severest of charges. It is this politics of naming that is the subject of Mahmood Mamdani's explosive new book, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror.Like the Middle East, parts of Africa have been engulfed in conflict for much of the post-colonial period. While the media coverage in both cases is perfunctory, in the case of Africa it is also sporadic. To the extent that there is coverage, the emphasis is on the dramatic or the grotesque. When the subject is not war, it is usually famine, disease or poverty -- or sometimes all three -- and invariably the coverage lacks context. The wars are between "tribes" led by "warlords" that take place in "failed states" ruled by "corrupt dictators." Driven by primal motives, they rarely involve discernible issues. The gallery of rogues gives way only to a tableau of victims, inevitably in need of White saviors. A headline like "Can Bono save Africa?" is as illustrative of Western attitudes towards the continent as the comments of Richard Littlejohn, Britain's highest-paid columnist, who wrote at the peak of the Rwandan genocide, "Does anyone really give a monkey's about what happens in Rwanda? If the Mbongo tribe wants to wipe out the Mbingo tribe then as far as I am concerned that is entirely a matter for them."
Darfur is the conspicuous exception to this trend, though Rwanda did enter Western vocabulary after the 1994 genocide. This, Mamdani argues, is primarily due to the efforts of one organization -- the Save Darfur Coalition (SDC) -- whose advocacy has been central to turning this into the biggest mass movement in the United States since the anti-Vietnam mobilization, bigger than the anti-apartheid movement. While the mobilization did have the salutary effect of raising awareness about an issue otherwise unknown to the majority of US citizens, its privileging of acting over knowing renders this less meaningful. Indeed, the campaign's shunning of complexity, its substituting of moral certainty for knowledge, and its preference for military solutions, precludes the very end that it purports to strive for. Invoking what it claims are lessons of the Nazi Holocaust and the Rwanda genocide, it combines slogans such as "never again" with the battle cries of a new "good war," "boots on the ground" and "out of Iraq and into Darfur," to call for military intervention in Sudan. Mamdani contends that SDC is not a peace movement, it is a war movement. If the signature activity of the anti-Vietnam war movement was the teach-in, for the SDC it is the advertising campaign; the expert has been replaced by the celebrity.
The SDC was established in July 2004 through the combined efforts of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and the American Jewish World Service. It has since been joined by a broad spectrum of political and religious organizations, a gaggle of celebrities and prominent intellectuals. It has spawned student chapters all across the country that range from the high school to university levels. Led by an advertising executive, it is the only organization capable of bringing together such unlikely partners as the Reverend Al Sharpton and author Elie Wiesel, actor George Clooney and former US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton. However, the apparent diversity of its affiliates obscures the fact that its agenda is driven mostly by Zionists and the Christian Right. However, Mamdani pays scant attention to the composition of the SDC even though he devotes a whole chapter to its politics and methods. As The Jerusalem Post reported ahead of the SDC's rally in Washington on 30 April 2006, it is "[l]ittle known ... that the coalition, which has presented itself as 'an alliance of over 130 diverse faith-based, humanitarian and human rights organizations' was actually begun exclusively as an initiative of the American Jewish community." It noted that even in 2006 that coalition was "heavily weighted" with a "diverse collection of local and national Jewish groups." Many have used Darfur as a strategic distraction from Israeli crimes against the Palestinians, as Ned Goldstein has argued in his investigation of the Zionist interests behind the SDC (most recently at the United Nations Durban II conference against racism). The salient feature of the propaganda is to paint the conflict as war between "Arabs" and "Africans" and to label the violence "genocide."
The genocide debate hinges on two factors: numbers and identity. For mass violence to qualify as genocide the killing has to be on a large enough scale, and the intent to eliminate a discrete ethnic or racial group has to be established. Mamdani argues that in order to sustain its claim of genocide, the SDC has inflated casualty figures and racialized the conflict.
The mortality figure of 400,000 has become a staple of SDC propaganda even though it has been repeatedly discredited. In 2007, the British Advertising Standards Authority chided the SDC (and the Aegis Trust) for breaching "standards of truthfulness" in its use of the figure for its UK advertising campaign. The number had already been challenged when a panel convened by the US Government Accountability Office in collaboration with the National Academy of Sciences concluded that of the six estimates they studied, the figures presented by the SDC were the least reliable. The most reliable estimate was the study carried out by the World Heath Organization-affiliated Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) that had recorded 131,000 excess deaths at the peak of the conflict of which only 30 percent were due to violence. The violence had dropped sharply after January 2005; this, Mamdani avers, was due mainly to the intervention of African Union peacekeepers. By 2008, the total deaths for the whole year had dropped to 1,500. These numbers are far lower than what constitutes an emergency according to the UN, let alone genocide.
The conflict began as a civil war in 1987-89, driven less by race or ethnic rivalries than by a struggle for land and resources -- it pitted the mostly nomadic landless Arabs against the mostly sedentary Fur peasants. Compounded by Khartoum's botched attempt at land reform during the 1990s, turning it into a party to the civil war, the simmering conflict erupted into a full-scale insurgency in 2003. This eventually led to the government's brutal counterinsurgency campaign where it turned to nomadic tribes from Darfur and Chad to serve as proxies.
Mamdani identifies three causes as having contributed to the conflict. First, is the history of colonial rule wherein the British went about a project of retribalizing Darfur through a system of native administration that created tribal homelands and introduced a principle of discrimination that privileged "natives" over "settlers." This led to the dispossession of nomadic tribes, especially the camel nomads of the north. The tribal identities were further solidified through a census that required each registrant to choose a "race;" a written history that presented Arabs as "settlers" from the Middle East; and laws that gave preferential treatment to whoever was deemed a "native." This narrative also allowed the British colonizers to present themselves as merely following the precedent of an earlier Arab colonization.
Drought and desertification was the second contributing factor. The Sahara's southern rim expanded by 100 kilometers, forcing nomadic tribes further south and eventually to encroach on the lands of the sedentary Fur tribes.
Finally, the civil war in neighboring Chad where opposition groups armed by Cold War rivals -- the US, France and Israel on one side, and Libya and the Soviet Union on the other -- had frequently taken refuge in Darfur, leading to a proliferation of weapons and militias. Mamdani explains that the Western powers were involved in the conflict long before the Sudanese government was; and Omar al-Bashir's Islamist regime wasn't even in power at the time.
The Arab-versus-African narrative obscures the fact that since at least the British colonial era, Arabs have been Darfur's most deprived constituency. "If Darfur was marginal in Sudan," writes Mamdani, "the Arabs of Darfur were marginal in Darfur." Contrary to the British historiography -- whose assumptions have since been reproduced in 20th century nationalist writings -- most Arabs arrived in Sudan as refugees fleeing persecution in Mamluk Egypt. Moreover, the diffusion of Arab culture was more a consequence of commerce than of conquest. Mamdani demonstrates that "Arab" is not a racial, ethnic, or cultural identity. It is an assumed political identity that is more a reflection of preference and power than of genealogy. For example, former slaves once freed would become Fur in Darfur, and Arab in Funj, the Sultanate in riverine Sudan where Arabs dominated. To be an Arab in Darfur therefore signifies nothing so much as weakness. The conflict in Darfur today is as much between Arabs (the Abbala camel nomads against the Baggara cattle nomads) as it is against the relatively privileged Fur and Massalit, and the less privileged Zaghawa. The SDC however emphasizes the north-south axis of the conflict that pits Arab against Fur and ignores the south-south axis which pits Arab against Arab.
The Darfuri rebels likewise defy easy classification. When the insurgency began in 2003, there were two major groups -- the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) -- they have now split into 26. JEM, which is the largest rebel organization, has an Islamist orientation and draws its inspiration from Hassan al-Turabi, the influential Sudanese Islamist and onetime ally of Omar al-Bashir. In contrast, the SLA is secular-Africanist with ties to the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the south (led by the late John Garang). Before the split between the Islamists in Khartoum, the government had employed Darfuri Islamists led by future JEM founder Khalil Ibrahim for its counterinsurgency in the south. (Ibrahim opposed the power-sharing agreement that ended the war in the south.) However, according to Sudan scholar Alex de Waal, both organizations learned "to characterize their plight in the simplified terms that had proved so effective in winning foreign sympathy for the south: they were the 'African' victims of an 'Arab' regime." The government's response to the insurgency was at first a half-hearted attempt at reconciliation, followed by the arming of a proxy force comprising nomadic militias, many of them from Chad, who have come to be known as the Janjawid. The consequences were devastating, with large-scale bloodletting and the displacement of 2.5 million people.
Khartoum's use of proxies to quell an insurgency and the resulting death and displacement parallel US policies in Iraq, where ethnic-sectarian militias have been deployed against the mostly-Sunni insurgency. Yet, unlike Iraq, where in excess of a million have died according to the latest Opinion Research Business poll, and five million displaced, the violence in Darfur has been labeled a genocide. Darfur has also spawned domestic mobilization in the US on a scale for which there is no parallel in the case of Iraq. Mamdani argues that this is due to the fact that Iraq requires Americans to act as citizens, with all the responsibility and complicated political choices it entails, whereas Darfur only requires them to act as humans where they choose to take responsibility out of a sense of philanthropy. He notes that "In Darfur, Americans can feel themselves to be what they know they are not in Iraq: powerful saviors." As the Nigerian writer Uzodinma Iweala observed, "It seems that these days, wracked by guilt at the humanitarian crisis it has created in the Middle East, the West has turned to Africa for redemption." In adopting the language of good and evil, Mamdani observes, the SDC has acted as "the great depoliticizer" in precluding political reconciliation in favor of a moral (read military) solution.
In Saviors and Survivors, Mamdani emphasizes regional over international solutions. Western modes of conflict resolution in Africa resemble nothing so much as the International Monetary Fund's Structural Adjustment Programs: "Those who made decisions did not have to live with their consequences, nor pay for them." The Western emphasis on the humanitarian crisis in lieu of a political solution merely prolongs the conflict. By contrast, the AU's approach is both humanitarian and political. The African Union's (AU) intervention in Darfur had been largely successful in reducing the violence, yet its operation was undermined by Western powers that failed to deliver the support they had pledged when the AU brokered the N'DJamena ceasefire agreement in April 2004. It was also vilified in SDC propaganda. Mamdani asserts that much of the foot-dragging was to discredit the AU so that the notion of an African solution for an African problem could be discredited. The aim was to "blue hat" the AU forces and bring them under Western command. In a Washington Post op-ed pointedly titled "Stop Trying To 'Save' Africa," Iweala asked, "How is it that a former mid-level US diplomat receives more attention for his cowboy antics in Sudan than do the numerous African Union countries that have sent food and troops and spent countless hours trying to negotiate a settlement among all parties in that crisis?"
The recent International Criminal Court case has further entrenched the Khartoum government in its defiant stance. Criminal prosecutions during an ongoing conflict merely exacerbate matters, Mamdani argues. More so when the adjudicating body has a demonstrable record of bias. The model for justice must be the post-Apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission rather than Nuremberg -- survivors' justice rather than victors' justice. The well-being of surviving multitudes must not be subordinated to the imperative of punishing individual perpetrators. Mamdani offers a trenchant critique of what he calls the "New Humanitarian Order," which has supplanted traditional colonialism and turned human rights into the new pretext for intervention. The "international community," which Mamdani argues is nothing more than a "post-Cold War nom de guerre for the Western powers," has created "a bifurcated system whereby state sovereignty obtains in large parts of the world but is suspended in more and more countries in Africa and the Middle East," reducing citizens to wards in "an open-ended international rescue operation."
The Obama Administration already appears to be making a break with its predecessor's approach and has ordered a review of its Sudan policy. Scott Gration, the new envoy, has already visited Khartoum and Darfur, as has John Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the case of the Bush Administration, the SDC was able to mobilize Congress against the State Department that was seeking a political resolution modeled on the power-sharing agreement that ended the longstanding conflict in the south. It remains to be seen how much the Obama Administration is able to resist the formidable lobbying power of the SDC. While Mamdani maintains that the aim of the SDC is to induce the US government to intervene militarily in Sudan, it appears that the real interest of its core organizations is to perpetuate the conflict so as to continue using the image of the Arab as the perpetrator to distract from the regional reality of the Arab as the victim.
Muhammad Idrees Ahmad is the co-founder of PULSE. He can be reached at m.idrees A T gmail D O T com.
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